Notes
BUILDING A BETTER MOUSETRAP:
PATENTING BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The Onco-mouse is a mouse that is genetically engineered to be
susceptible to human cancer.' As such, the animal is a valuable tool
for researchers studying the origins of human cancer and pursuing a
treatment for the disease. For six years, however, the Onco-mouse
was trapped in the flawed European Community (EC) patent system
while a debate raged on the ethics of patenting a life form. It is
apparent that the real victim of the inadequate EC patent system in
this case was not the Onco-mouse or its inventor. Rather, the EC was
the real victim as the Community goals of a common market and of
global competitiveness in biotechnology atrophied while the ethical
debate continued. Indeed, the EC was caught in a mousetrap of its
own device.
Biotechnology is a global industry' that is well suited to the
1. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866,1089 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 703 (April 12,1988) [hereinafter
Onco-mouse patent]. The Onco-mouse patent covers "a transgenic nonhuman eukaryotic animal
(preferably a rodent such as a mouse) whose germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated
oncogene sequence introduced into the animal ... which... increases the probability of the
development of neoplasms (particularly malignant tumors) in the animal." Id. The mouse was
a product of modem biotechnology produced using recombinant DNA techniques. Recombinant
DNA technology allows direct manipulation of the genetic material of individual cells to control
production of biological material. This technology is used to develop new organisms with special
uses or to make existing products more efficient. See eg., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS
4 (1984) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY]. For a more detailed discussion of the
scientific techniques used in recombinant DNA, see Sean Johnston, Comment, PatentProtection
for the Protein Products of Recombinant DNA, 4 HIGH TECH. LJ. 249,251-54 (1989).
2. See, e.g., TREVOR COOK ETAL, PHARMACEUTICALS, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW

5 (1991). The main applications of biotechnology are in industries as diverse as health care,
pharmaceutical, medical research, pesticides, fertilizers, and chemicals. See id.; see also U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

7-12 (1991) [hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL] (discussing the role of biotechnology in the
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resources of the EC. The EC has strong research capacities in fields
such as pharmaceuticals, which are typically commercialized by
biotechnology.' However, research alone does not translate directly
into marketable and profitable industrial applications. 4 A patent
protection system is needed to shepherd innovation into application.
Patent protection is a crucial link between research and commercial
success because it stimulates innovation with the promise of reward.5
The Commission of the European Communities (Commission) has said
that "[t]he economic and social prosperity of the European Economic
Community depends heavily on the growth and success of activities
leading to innovation ... closely allied with the use of the patents
system.' '6 Therefore, the goals of the EC of creating a common
pharmaceutical, agricultural, chemical, and environmental protection industries); Joan O'C.
Hamilton et al., Biotech America's DreamMachine, Bus. WK., Mar. 2,1992, at 66-73 [hereinafter
Dream Machine] (discussing the economic growth potential of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical, agriculture, and chemical industries).
3. See, ag., Biotechnology in the Community: Communication from the Commission to
the Council, COM(83)672 final/2-Annex at 12-13 (discussing "strategic significance" of
biotechnology to the EC). For example, the European pharmaceutical industry provides onethird of worldwide pharmaceutical production. COOK ET AL, supra note 2, at 7. Europe
represents over a quarter of the world market for such products, and it employs over 500,000
people in the industry, including 75,000 in research and development. Id. ("Europe's strengths
in pharmaceutical and agriculture lend themselves to the adoption of biotechnology.").
4. See generally Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final (discussing
fragmented Community efforts in biotechnology and the need for a more systematic approach
to tap the benefits of biotechnology). A striking example of research that did not directly
translate into commercial marketability involves patent protection for penicillin in the United
Kingdom (UK). Although the UK led in scientific research, United States industry benefited
because of more favorable patent protection. Joseph Straus, The Development and Status of
European Law, in ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL ISSUES 16,17 (William
H. Lesser ed., 1989). The United States was the victim of a similar experience involving Japanese
commercialization of United States research in the areas of semiconductors and computers. See,
e.g., Peter G. Gosselin, ForJapanand the U.S., a Reversal of Fortune, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26,
1991, at 1, 8; U.S. Industry Could Lose Ground to Japanby 2000 Unless Changes Made, Study
Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at 95, May 15, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File [hereinafter Biotechnology 2000]. Some commentators fear that the United States
biotechnology industry could suffer a similar fate. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2,
at 39; BIOTECHNOLOGY 2000, supra. However, the EC is currently the most at risk of lagging
behind permanently on the global level. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 19-21;
COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 21.
5. See SHELDON KRIMSK'Y, BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL

GENETICS 51 (1991) ("Patent law is built on a philosophy that patent protection must nourish
innovation and not stifle it."); Alan R. Geraldi, Comment, In His Image: On PatentingHumanBased Bioproducts,25 U.S.F. L. REv. 583, 592 (1991); see also infra note 48 and accompanying
text (discussing the special importance of patents for biotechnology).
6. COMMISsION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PATINNOVA '90: STRATEGIES FOR
THE PROTECrION OF INNOVATION:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION 217 (U. Tager & A. von Witzleben eds., 1991)
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European market and of increasing international competitiveness 7
would be furthered by enhancing patent protection for the products of
biotechnology in the Community. The Onco-mouse will serve as an
example for the following discussion on how the EC can harness the
potential of the rapidly growing European biotechnology industry8
while managing the ethical concerns about patenting biotechnology.
The Onco-mouse first stimulated discussion in the scientific and
legal communities9 when the United States awarded a patent0 on the
mouse to a researcher at Harvard University in 1988." That was the
first patent ever granted on an animal. 2 Recently, Harvard was

(comments of Jose Mota Maia, President of INPI, Ministry of Industry and Energy of Portugal).
The Commission has stressed the "importance of modem biotechnology for the future of... the
Community" and the "absence in the Community of a context supportive and encouraging for
biotechnology." Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E2.
7. An essential goal of the EC was to create a common market among member states as
well as a unified economic unit to compete on an international level. See TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 2.

8. Biotechnology is a set of biological techniques applied to existing industries.
BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 3, 39.

The biotechnology industry refers to an

aggregate of many commercial applications of biotechnology. Id.at 31, 39. The economic
promise of biotechnology has already been demonstrated in the United States. See, eg., Dream
Machine, supra note 2, at 66. For a discussion of the economic importance of patents analyzed
from the American perspective, see Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting
Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ.1, 22-25 (1991);

Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 450-53
(1969).
9. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative reaction to the
Onco-mouse patent and other applications of the scientific principles underlying the Oncomouse); see also ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUEspassim (William

H. Lesser ed., 1989) (containing a collection of articles on the legal, economic, and social
implications of animal patents); David Manspeizer, Note, The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare,and
the HarvardMouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New, Genetically-EngineeredWonderland, 43
RUTGERS L. REV.417 (1991) (reviewing the issues relating to animal patents both in the United
States and in Europe); Marsha L. Montgomery, Note, Building a Better Mouse-and Patenting
It: Altering the PatentLaw to Accommodate MulticellularOrganisms, 41 CASE W. RES.L. REv.
231 (1990) (discussing the legal response to the Onco-mouse in the United States).
10. A United States patent confers upon the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention for seventeen years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
After the limited monopoly is over, the public is free to use the invention. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that without the patent system the inventor would "keep his invention
secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit
to the community, the patent is granted." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87
(1933)). The principle of exclusion as a reward and incentive is the universal premise behind
patent systems worldwide. See, eg., PAUL DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS,
AND EEC LAW 3-8 (1978).
11. Onco-mouse patent, supra note 1, at 703.
12. See, eg., BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supranote 2, at 214.
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granted a patent in EuropeP for the same Onco-mouse, prompting
a debate in Europe'4 and the European Community." That patent
was granted after considerable debate and discussion in the European
Patent Office (EPO). 6 Proponents of biotechnological patents see
the Onco-mouse patent as a modest step toward achieving patent
protection for beneficial biotechnology products, while opponents view
this type of patent as an inappropriate and unethical encouragement
of genetic engineering.'7
This Note discusses the importance of enhancing legal protection
for biotechnological patents in the EC and urges the enactment a
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Proposed Directive). 8 Part II outlines the reasons
that reform of the EC patent system is necessary in the field of
biotechnology. Part III introduces the Proposed Directive, which
would enhance protection of biotechnological inventions, but which has
been delayed by concerns over bioethics. Finally, Part IV urges
enactment of the Proposed Directive, arguing that the ethical issues
arising in conjunction with the Proposed Directive are misplaced in the
patent system and are adequately addressed both by the EC regulatory
system and by the Proposed Directive itself In the end, it is clear that

13. Patents are enforceable contracts only with the nation that grants the patent. See COOK
Er AL., supra note 2, at 59. Therefore, to have a valid patent in multiple nations, the inventor
must apply and get the patent approved in each nation. See i.dThis was the procedure that
Harvard University followed to obtain a European patent for the Onco-mouse.
14. See, e.g., Suzanne Perry, Frankenstein and Hitler Loom Large as Europe Debates
"Bioethics", Reuters, May 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
15. See, e.g., Success for "Inventor" of a Mouse, Bus. L. BRIEF, Jan. 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Suzanne Perry, Decision to GrantPatenton "HarvardMouse"
Won't Stop EC Debate, Reuters, Oct. 16, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File
[hereinafter EC Debate]; Genetically Engineered Mouse May be Patentablein Europe, 40 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 535 (Oct. 25,1990).
16. See HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur.Pat. Off. Rep. 525 (Examining Div.), acq.,
1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 501 (Tech. Bd. App.), rev'g & remand'g, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4
(Examining Div.); Patentingthe HarvardMouse, Bus. L. BRIEF, May 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni file; see infra notes 75-5 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions
of the Examining Division and the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO regarding the
patentability of the Onco-mouse).
17. See generally HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur.Pat. Off. Rep. 525,526 (stating the
position of the ECI on the ethical questions involved, in view of the "extraordinary attention the
present case has attracted from the public"); EC Debate, supra note 15 (discussing the effect of
the European Patent Office decision to grant a patent on the Onco-mouse on efforts to afford
animal inventions legal protection and on the ensuing public ethical debate).
18. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, 1989 OJ. (C 10) 3 [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
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passage of the Proposed Directive is a crucial step if the EC is to
become competitive in the emerging global market of biotechnology.
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN

THE EC
Enhanced biotechnology patent protection in the EC requires
uniform protection for products throughout the member states.1
Currently, differences exist in the legal protection afforded to
biotechnological inventions in the respective member states which
Unless
create barriers to trade and an effective internal market
these differences are minimized, free trade could be hampered as

member states adopt conflicting legislation and policies.' The EC
has already recognized that uniform protection of intellectual property
is important for a unified common market. 2 Nevertheless, the EC
must implement further intellectual property protection for biotechnological inventions in order to achieve the goal of a common market.
A. The Existing European Patent System
The EC currently operates under what is known as the European
Patent Convention (EPC), an agreement that has been signed by all
EC member states except Portugal.' Article 52 of the EPC defines
Specifically, Article
patentability in the European Community.'
52(1) states that "European patents shall be granted for any inventions

19. See eg., i. at 3-4.
INFO-92, Aug. 8, 1992, available
20. See id.; LegalProtection.Biotechnologicallnventions,
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur file.
21. See Proposed Directive, supra note 18, at 3.
22. Recognizing the importance of intellectual property to the biotechnology area, the EC
recently strengthened patent protection for pharmaceutical products by extending the terms of
such patents. See Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 Concerning the Creation of a
Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products, 1992 OJ. (L 182) 1,1; see also Alan
K. Palmer & Thomas C. Vinje, The EC Directive on the Legal Protectionof Computer Software"
New Law Governing Software Development, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 65 (1992) (discussing
recent EC software directive and intellectual property protection for high technology products).
23. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5,1973,13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter
EPC]. The EPC is a procedural agreement that allows applicants to apply through the EPO to
receive multiple national patents for each member state of the EPC. See BIOTECHNOLOGY
GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 208.
24. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 208. The EPC also covers Austria,
Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Id.
25. EPC, supra note 23, art. 52, 13 LL.M. at 285.
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which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new, and
which involve an inventive step."'
Subsequent provisions of the EPC narrow the broad language of
potential patentability declared in Article 52(1). First, the EPC details
with some clarity matter which does not have a sufficient "inventive
step" to be patentable. Such materials include mathematical models,
aesthetic creations, and presentations of information.' Next, categorical exclusions from the general rule of patentability are listed under
Article 5 3 .s Particularly relevant to this discussion, Article 53(b)
excludes "plant or animal varieties" and "essentially biological
processes" from patentability.29 However, in contrast to the foregoing
explanation of matter not rising to the level of an invention under
Article 52, the terms "varieties" or "essentially biological" are not
defined under Article 53 or elsewhere in the EPC.' While the
Guidelines for Examination of Patents (Guidelines) issued by the EPO
attempt to define these terms,3 ' the Guidelines are not binding on the
member states.32 Thus, a lack of uniformity in patent protection
26. Ia This is analogous to the patentability requirements in the United States, which
require that an invention be a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that is
new, useful, and nonobvious. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988).
27. EPC, supra note 23, art. 52(2), 13 LL.M. at 285.
28. Id, art. 53, 13 I.L.M. at 286.
29. Id. Article 53(b) of the EPC states: "European patents shall not be granted in respect
of... (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants
or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof."
ld., art. 53(b), 13 I.L.M. at 286.
30. See, eg., Straus, supra note 4, at 24. See generally EPC, supra note 23, arts. 52-53, 13
I.L.M. at 285-86 (lacking definition of terms). These terms, however, are defined or interpreted
outside the scope of the EPC. The drafters of the International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants defined "plant variety" as referring to a generic category of plants with
a common characteristic to satisfy homogeneity and stability in their essential characteristics.
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Oct. 23, 1978, arts.
6(1)(a), 6(1)(c)-6(1)(d), 33 U.S.T. 2703, 2711-12 [hereinafter UPOV]. The EPO has previously
interpreted "essentially biological" narrowly to grant protection for biological processes where
human intervention plays a substantial role. See LUBRIZOL/Hybrid Plants, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off.
Rep. 173, 178; see also Kevin W. O'Connor, PatentingAnimals and Other Living Things, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 597, 617 (1991) (human intervention must be greater than biological forces).
31. Chapter IV, Part C of the Guidelines for Examination at the European Patent Office
regarding Article 53(b) states:
The question whether a process is "essentially biological" is one of degree depending on
the extent to which there is technical intervention by man in the process; if such
intervention plays a significant part in determining or controlling the result it is desired
to achieve, the process would not be excluded.
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFIE, GuIDELInES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, ch. IV, 1 3.4 (1992) [hereinafter EPO GUIDELINES].
32. See, e.g., EXXON/Alumina Spine, 1988 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 387,391 ("The Guidelines
...do not have the binding authority of a legal text."). In addition, the patent granted through
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among member states is distinctly possible under the existing
definitional system. 33
B. The Exclusions Under the EPC Are Problematic
In addition to the ambiguities surrounding the key definitions
discussed above, the Article 53 exclusions from patentability are
problematic with regard to biotechnological patents for several reasons.
First, as noted by the European Parliament (Parliament), "the patent
system, when applied to living matter, must be adapted to the
problems linked to the special nature of such matter."' In light of
changing technology, the EC's international competitors have explicitly
declared living matter and even animals to be patentable and have
enacted special rules to deal with problems unique to patenting living
matter.35 However, under Article 53 of the EPC, only microbiological inventions' can be patented.'
Some member states have
responded to the inadequacies of the outdated EPC provisions in this
area by enacting national laws to deal specifically with biotechnolo38

gy.

the EPC offers limited protection to the applicant. See EPC, supra note 23, art. 138, 13 I.L.M.
at 302. As stated in the Commission of the European Communities Memo on the Draft
Directive, "A European Patent is granted, defined and revoked in applying rules of the EPC ....
For all other purposes, such as the scope of protection, European patents represent patents with
national effects, subject to national laws .... ." Straus, supra note 4, at 20, quoting Commission
of the European Communities Memo on the Draft Directive.
33. See Andrew I.A. Parkes, The Significance of the EuropeanPatent Convention and the
Community Patent Convention, in INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY: PAPERS FROM THE I.C.E.L.
CONFERENCE, APRIL 1989, at 51, 55 (Mary Robinson, ed. 1989). But see Straus, supra note 4,
at 20 (national courts of Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have followed the EPO
practice).
34. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions
Approved with the Following Amendments, 1992 0.. (C 125) 183, 183 (Amendment No. 3)
[hereinafter Amended Proposal].
35. See infra notes 62-74, 100 and accompanying text.
36. See EPC, supra note 23, art. 53,13 I.L.M. at 286. Patentable microbiological inventions
include the following: (1) micro-organism, (2) process to make a micro-organism, (3) process
using a micro-organism, (4) products obtained from microbiological process, (5) DNA/RNA
molecules or subcellular units. EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 31, ch. IV, 3.5-3.6.
37. EPC, supra note 23, art. 53, 13 I.L.M. at 286. The EPC adopted the prevailing
intellectual property conventions, such as the Strasbourg Convention, when the EPC was ratified.
See Straus, supra note 4, at 18. The Strasbourg Convention made it mandatory to protect
microbiological processes and their resulting products. See Convention on the Unification of
Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention, Nov. 27,1963, art. 2(b), Europ. T.S.
No. 47. Therefore, there was no consideration of new scientific developments such as the
distinction between microbiology and macrobiology. See Straus, supra note 4, at 18.
38. "New legislation specific to the regulation of biotechnology [has been] enacted in
Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom." BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supranote 2, at 174.
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Second, the interpretation of the plant and animal varieties
exclusion may be problematic. The basis of this exclusion was that,
under the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (UPOV), another method exists besides patenting
through which to obtain legal protection for plant varieties. The
Convention declared that plant varieties were entitled either to a
special title of protection or to a patent, but not both.39 Unlike
plants, however, animals do not have protection outside the scope of
the EC patent system, under the UPOV or any other convention.
Nonetheless, this exclusionary provision was invoked in the HARVARD/Onco-mouse decision by the Examining Division, which
considered the Onco-mouse to be a type of animal variety.'
C. Inconsistency Under the Current EPC System
The member states of the EC also have inadequate guidance on
patenting biotechnological inventions because of inconsistent EPO
decisions. Two prior decisions by the EPO Technical Board of Appeal
indicate a propatent protection attitude41 and seem initially to
forecast fundamental change to the patent system.42
In the Hybrid Plants/LUBRIZOL decision, the Technical Board
of Appeal narrowly construed one of the stated exceptions to the
general rule of patentability.43
Also, in the CIBA-

In addition, where possible, existing legislation has been amended, such as in The Netherlands.
See John Hodgson, Dutch Regulations Now in Force,BIotTECHNoLOGY, Apr. 1990, at 284.
39. See UPOV, supra note 30, art. 2(1), 33 U.S.T. at 2708.
40. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
41. See LUBRIZOL/Hybrid plants, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 173; CIBAGEIGY/Propagating material, [1979-85] Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. Vol. C. 758.
42. Fundamental changes in patent law have been previously sparked by court decisions,
at least in the United States. See Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & int.
1987) (genetically engineered oysters are potentially patentable, even though they are living
matter); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,972,976 (manmade, biologically pure culture of microorganism
is patentable because it only occurs in an impure form in nature). These decisions foreshadowed
the PTO announcement, although it was most immediately prompted by the ruling in Allen. See
Donald 3. Quigg, Animals-Patentability, Statement of April 7, 1989, reprinted in ANIMAL
PATENTS, supranote 9, at 159 (outlining the holding of Allen and the rationale behind it, as well
as the scope of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101). For a more detailed discussion of case law
preceding and foreshadowing the PTO decision, see Bradford Chaucer, Note, Life, The Patent
Office and Everything: Patentabilityof Lifeforms Created Through Bioengineering Techniques, 9
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 413 (1988).
43. The Board held that the question of whether or not a nonmicrobiological process could
be considered "essentially biological" and hence, unpatentable, should be narrowly construed
based on the essence of the invention and the totality of human intervention.
LUBRIZOJHybrid plants, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 173,177.
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GEIGY/PropagatingMaterialdecision, the Board narrowly construed
the Article 53(b) exclusion clause and held that "no general exclusion
in the sphere of animate nature could be inferred from
of inventions
'44
EPC.
the
In HARVARD/Onco-mouse, however, the Examining Division
initially refused to construe Article 53(b) narrowly and thus broke with
the preceding opinions on the basis that there was different legislative
intent behind the provision for plant and animal varieties.45 The
Appeals Board disagreed and noted that "[a]ny such exception must,
as repeatedly pointed out by the Boards of Appeal, be narrowly
construed." 46 Because of HARVARD/Onco-mouse, the interpretation
of Article 53(b) is unsettled.47 In addition, by introducing Article
53(a) as a consideration in its patentability decision, the Examining
Division thus set forth another consideration for member states to
apply when determining patentability without any guidance other than
the dicta from the HARVARD/Onco-mouse decision itself
This environment of inconsistent EPO case law may have a
chilling effect on commercial biotechnology-a field where the
economic incentive of the patent system is necessary to stimulate
biotechnology research and development. This is true because
Inventors who cannot
biotechnology research is very expensive.'
protection will be
granted
will
be
inventions
their
predict whether

44. CIBA-GEIGY/Propagating material, [1979-85] Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. Vol. C. 758, 759;

see also BRUKER/Non-invasive measurement, 1988 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 357, 360 (narrowly
construing the exclusionary clause of Article 52(4), regarding medicinal products).

45. The Examining Division found that "[t]he restrictive interpretation of the exclusion of
plant varieties is ...justified by the limited purpose of the [UPOV Convention] provision to

exclude from patent protection only such subject-matter which is eligible for plant variety
protection," thus avoiding double protection. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep.
4,7.
46. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 501, 510 (citation omitted).
47. See Success for "Inventor" of a Mouse, supra note 15 (EPO decision in HARleaves future patentability questions up in the air and subject to EPO
VARD/Onco-mouse still
review on an individual basis).

48. The Commission has stated that "the investments required in research and development
particularly for genetic engineering are especially high and especially risky and the possibility for

recouping that investment can only effectively be guaranteed through adequate legal protection."
Proposed Directive, supra note 18, at 3; see also BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 19
(discussing the vast funding and patent protection received by United States biotechnology
companies and how instrumental such protection is to innovation); IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING
AND THE CONsTITbTON: AN INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND GENETIC

EXPERIMENTATION 23, 26 (1985) (discussing the National Institute of Health's financial assistance
to recombinant life form projects and United States courts' interpretation of these gene-splicing

exercises as falling within the patent statutes).
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dissuaded from investing in the EC.49 In fact, Martin Bangemann,
vice-president of the Commission, noted in a recent debate on the
Proposed Directive that the Directive affects the competitiveness of
the EC and that "[e]ven now entire research sections of the industries
...

are leaving the Community because the legal position is unclear,

causing us to lose not only the researchers, who were employed there,
but technological capacity."'
D. International Pressure
Reform in the EC is also increasingly necessary as the United
States, Japan, and other nations develop and protect biotechnological
innovation. 5' International investment is lured by strong and effective
patent protection,52 and there seems to be a correlation between
flexible laws that protect biotechnology and economic prosperity.53
The Commission has acknowledged that the EC lags behind its
international competitors in the area of biotechnology.'
This
discrepancy can be explained by the insufficient and inconsistent legal
protection afforded by EC law in this area 5
International competition has become even stronger since the
current regulatory atmosphere in the United States favors biotechnology. For example, the United States Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) recently decided that it would not regulate food products

49. The Director of the Senior Advocacy Group on Biotechnology (SAGB), a Brusselsbased committee of major chemical companies, noted that "[i]f our companies can't use their
innovations on a par with their competitors in the United States or Japan, they will either decline
or move their investments elsewhere." David Buchan, Biotech Groups FindBright New World
Slow to Dawn:Europe'sPatentLegislationandRegulationsHave CausedFrustrationin the Sector,
FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1992, at 2.
50. 1992 O.J. (Annex 3-417) 17,23 (Apr. 6, 1991) (Debates of the European Parliament)
[hereinafter Debates].
51. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 205-13 (outlining sources of
international intellectual property protection and international property rights in biotechnology).
52. See K.F. BErn, R.S. CRESpi, & J. STRAus, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT
PROTECnON: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIMw 88 (1985).
53. The United States and Japan have the most liberal legal protection in this area and are
at the forefront of the competition. See id.; BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 17-21.
54. See, eg., Proposed Directive, supra note 18, at 3; Biotechnology in the Community,
COM(83)672 final at E3, E5 (noting the necessity of taking actions designed to "stimulate
biotechnology in the Community and to increase competitiveness in Europe's bio-industries").
More recently, the EPO has also noted that further steps need to be taken to improve the
European patent system in order to lay the foundation for a "common internal and technological
market in Europe." 1990 EPO ANN. REP. 8; see also Buchan, supra note 49, at 2 (Biotechnology
investment is shifting to the United States where the climate is more favorable to patents).
55. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
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derived from genetic engineering56 any differently than other food
products. 7 Since no additional requirements are imposed on genetically engineered food, the FDA decision may stimulate the development of new genetically engineered food and the patents to protect
such products. International competition was a significant factor in
this decision: "[t]he United States is already the world leader in
biotechnology and we want to keep it that way."58 This decision
allows the United States' biotechnology industry to establish an early
lead in the biotechnology food market and to remain at the forefront
of biotechnological development 9 until its competitors make similar
accommodations.
E. The Problems Encountered by the Onco-Mouse Are Illustrative
of the Inadequacy of Biotechnology Protection
The problems that the EC will face without the enactment of the
Proposed Directive are highlighted by an examination of the issues
raised in HARVARD/Onco-mouse. ° That case illustrates how the
United States patent system is currently more efficient than the EPC
system under which the EC operates. Similar patent applications for
the Onco-mouse were filed in the United States and Europe, although
the patent was granted much faster in the United States. 61 This is a
56. The regulations concern genetically engineered food-vegetables or fruits that contain
traces of genes from other plants or organisms. For a discussion of possible new foods appearing
in the marketplace, see Sibella Kraus, Big BusinessPursuesthe Foods of the Future,S.F. CHRON.,
July 8, 1992, at 4.
57. See Gene-Altered Food Called Safe, Facts on File World News Digest, May 28, 1992,
at 392 E2, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file; Ben Hirschler, Biotech Moves Into Food,
But Will Consumers Bite, Reuters, June 24,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters file;
Oppenheimer makes $10 million investment in PGS, Business Wire, July 7, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires file. The FDA will not require premarket review for foods which
have been genetically altered as long as the constituents are substantially the same as substances
currently found in other foods. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties,
57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992); FDA to Regulate Biotech FoodProducts Under Same Rules Used for
All OtherFoods, Wash. Insider (BNA), May 27,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
58. FDA to Regulate Biotech Food ProductsUnder Same Rules Usedfor All OtherFoods,
supranote 57 (comments of Vice-President Dan Quayle). Vice-President Quayle noted that "[i]n
1991 alone [biotechnology] was a $4 billion industry. It should reach at least $50 billion by the
year 2000 as long as we resist the spread of unnecessary regulation." Id.
59. See Hirschler, supra note 57.
60. See HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,526-28.
61. The total time from application date to grant of patent lasted four years in the United
States versus six years in Europe. Compare Onco-mouse patent, supra note 1, at 703 (four years
from application date to patent grant) with BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 217
(European patent application filed June 24, 1985) and EC Debate, supra note 15 (European
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result of the increased receptiveness by the United States' patent
system to the Onco-mouse patent application-a response that can be
explained by a series of events which enhanced protection of biotechnology in the United States.
The Onco-mouse patent received a warm reception in the United
States relative to that in the EC due to fundamental advances in the
United States' patent system. First, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,the
United States Supreme Court (Court) declared that living matter could
be patented if it satisfied the normal criteria for patentability under the
United States' federal patent statute.62 Thus, when the Court allowed
a patent to be issued for a genetically engineered strain of bacteria
that could disintegrate oil spills,63 the development of the biotechnology industry was stimulated. 6' Second, in 1987 the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) announced that nonhuman,
multicellular organisms that did not occur naturally could be patented.' Subsequently, the Onco-mouse became the first such organism
to be patented. 66
However, the grant of the Onco-mouse patent did not occur
without controversy in the United States. Legislative and public
debate was stimulated on the ethical implications of patenting living
matter. Most claims were based on bioethical concerns lying outside
of the patent system.67 While legislation was introduced in Congress
to reverse the PTO decision,' it was ultimately decided that a patent
Onco-mouse patent granted in October, 1991).
62. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980).
63. Id. at 305, 318.
64. See, eg., BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supranote 2, at 209. The flood of biotechnological patent applications was a factor in the creation of a new examining unit in the PTO. See id.
Between 1980 and 1991, the PTO received nearly 20,000 biotechnology patent applications. See
Sandra Sugawara, Drug Patent Race Heads to the Bench, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at H7.
65. Quigg, supra note 42, at 159 (announcing the United States Patent Office position on
patenting higher animal life).
66. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supranote 2, at 214; 134 CONG. REC. H7436 (daily ed.
Sept. 13, 1988) (statement of Representative Kastenmeier).
67. The most commonly discussed ethical dilemmas in this area are that the patents will
interfere with the natural world, devalue human life, increase animal suffering, reduce genetic
diversity, accelerate commercialization of academic research, and undermine the family farm. See
Rebecca Dresser, Ethicaland Legal Issues in PatentingNew Animal Life, 28 JURIMETRIcS J. 399,
410-24 (1988) (containing an in-depth discussion of ethical dilemmas).
68. Legislation was introduced in the 100th and 101st Sessions of Congress to regulate
animal patents. See eg., H.R. 3247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1989); H.R. 3119, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2 (1987). Proposed legislation included an outright prohibition of animal patents. See,
eg., S. 2111, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); see also BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at
216 (box 12-C summarizes legislative efforts to reverse the PTO decision). For further discussion
of proposed legislation, see Robert L. Baechtold et al., PropertyRights In Living Matter: Is New
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does not materially increase the potential uses of an invention, and
that ethical considerations were unaffected by the issuance of such a
monopoly.69 As a result, no congressional proposals were passed. 70
Because the scientific principles underlying the Onco-mouse 7 ' could
be applied to genetically altered animals with other research applications7 biotechnological patent applications flooded the PTO73 and
the biotechnology industry flourished.74
In contrast to the experience of the Onco-mouse application in the
United States, the history of the Onco-mouse in Europe highlights the
inadequate patent protection afforded to biotechnology in the EC
system. Initially, the claims75 for the Onco-mouse patent were
refused 76 on the grounds that animals were excluded per se from
patentability under Article 53(b) of the EPC. 7 On appeal that

Law Required?, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 141, 150-52, 162-63 (1991); David Beier & Robert H.
Benson, Biotechnology PatentProtectionAct, 68 DENv. U. L. REv. 173,183-90 (1991) (the PTO
decision "opened the floodgates" of biotechnological investment).
69. See Stephen A. Bent, Issues and Prospectsin the USA, in ANIMAL PATENTS, supranote
9, at 8.
70. Some of the bills were approved in one chamber but not by both the House and the
Senate. See, eg., H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2, 4 (1988) (creating farmer's exemption
and statutory exclusion of humans from patentability); see also SECTION OF PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, 1990-91 ANNUAL REPORT 376 (Michael 0. Sutton, ed. 1992)
(summary of Congressional activities).
71. For detail on the techniques used in creating transgenic animals such as the Oncomouse, see O'Connor, supra note 30, at 608.
72. See, eg., Barnaby J. Feder, The 'Phanners'Who Breed Cows That Can Make Drugs,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9,1992, § 3, at 9; Genpharm Should Get TransgenicAnimal PatentWithin a Few
Months, 12 GENETIC TECH. NEWS 2 (1992).
73. The flood of biotechnology applications caused a processing backlog despite the fact
that the PTO created a new department to deal specifically with biotechnological patent
applications. See BIOTEcHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 213.
74. See L. Christopher Plein, Biotechnology: Issue Development and Evolution, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY: ASSESSING SOCIAL IMPACTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 158 (David 3.
Webber, ed. 1990) (the PTO decision "opened the floodgates" of biotechnological investment).
75. A claim defines the scope of a patent. See DONALD S.CHIsUM, 2 PATENTS § 8.01
(1992).
76. The claims at issue in this proceeding related to a method for producing a "transgenic
non-human mammalian animal having an increased probability of developing neoplasms"
(tumors), the resulting animal, and a resulting animal rodent. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990
Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4, 6 (claims 1, 17, and 18).
77. The Examining Division considered the Onco-mouse to be an animal variety and thus
per se unpatentable under Article 53(b) based on several facts. First, the Examining Division
found that unlike plant varieties, the animal varieties exclusion should not be narrowly
interpreted because when the EPC was ratified, nations had the opportunity to patent animal
varieties but elected not to do so. See id,
at 7. Second, the Examining Division found legislative
intent to exclude animals in general based on the fact that the three official languages of the EPC
used different terms for "animal varieties." Id.at 8.
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decision was reversed.'

The Technical Board of Appeals concluded

that Article 53(b) did not exclude animal patents per se.79 The case
was remanded to the Examining Division of the EPO to determine
whether the Onco-mouse was an animal variety under Article 53(b),
and whether it violated the ethical exclusion of Article 53(a) ° after
weighing the risks and benefits of the invention.81 The Examining
Division subsequently determined that the Onco-mouse was not an
animal variety." In addition, the Examining Division believed that
the Onco-mouse's contribution to human welfare outweighed potential
environmental risks and animal sufferings and thus determined that
it did not violate the ethical exclusion of Article 53(a).' In particular, the Examining Division noted:
The development of new technologies is normally afflicted with new
risks .... The experience has also shown that these risks should
not generally lead to a negative attitude vis-a-vis new technologies
but rather to a careful weighing up of the risks on the one hand and
the positive aspects on the other and that the result of this consideration should be the determining factor in whether a new technology
should be used or not. ... [B]iotechnological inventions and
particularly inventions relating to genetic engineering are not in
general excluded from patent protections

The Examining Division also rejected the patent under Article 83 of the EPC on the
grounds of insufficient disclosure because the patent covered all nonhuman animals but the
background experiments only involved mice. Id. at 11-13.
78. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 501, 507.
79. Id. at 510-11.
80. The EPC excludes from patentability inventions which are contrary to public order or
morality under article 53(a). EPC, supranote 23, art. 53(a), 13 I.L.M. at 286. Originally, Article
53(a) was not a factor in rejecting the application since the Examining Division considered patent
law an inappropriate "legislative tool" for resolving the ethical questions raised by the patent.
See HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4, 11; see also Patenting The Harvard
Mouse, supra note 16 (discussing the decisions of the Appeals Board and the Examining
Division).
81. The Examining Division examined these provisions at the request of the Appeals
Board. See HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,526.
82. Id. at 526.
83. The Examining Division found that the "invention's usefulness to mankind cannot be
denied" and that overall animal suffering would actually be reduced since fewer animals would
be needed in comparison to conventional testing. Id. at 527. Also, the probability of an
unintended release of the genetically altered mouse into the environment is small. Id. at 528.
With respect to the possibility of intentional misuse of the mouse, "[t]he mere fact that ...
uncontrollable acts are conceivable cannot be a major determinant for deciding whether a patent
should be granted or not." Id, at 528. For a discussion of the action taken by the Examining
Division on remand, see EC Debate, supra note 15.
84. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,528.
85. Id. at 527.
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Although the Onco-mouse eventually was granted a patent in
Europe,' it spent six years in the cumbersome EPC system before
the patent was approved.'
In the EC the limited commercial
monopoly granted by a patent retroactively applies to cover the time
elapsed since the date of the application.' As a result; the longer the
gap between the application date and patent grant, the more vulnerable an inventor is to competitors who may appropriate the inventor's
ideas.8 9 Furthermore, the time that the application sits in the EPC
system is deducted from the length of the resulting patent grant. Thus,
the longer the application process, the shorter the patent life.' The
lengthy time period for obtaining a biotechnological patent in the EC
results in a backlog of biotechnology applications and hinders the
international competitiveness of the Community.9'
F. Implications of the HARVARD/Onco-mouse Decision
The applicability of the HARVARD/Onco-mouse decision to
future EC biotechnological patents is limited because the decision is
very fact-specific. 2 Although some of the language of the decision
was phrased broadly,' the Examining Division specifically stated that
the "considerations apply solely to the present case and.., other cases
of transgenic animals are conceivable for which a different conclusion

86. The patent was finally granted in October, 1991. See HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991
Eur. Pat. Off., passim (decision to allow Onco-mouse patent); EC Debate, supra note 15.
87. Id. The patent was filed with the European Patent Office on June 24, 1985.
BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 217.
88. EPC, supra note 23, art. 63(1), 13 I.L.M. at 287 (term of patent is 20 years from the
date the application is filed).
89. European patent applications are published approximately 18 months after their filing
dates, which may require disclosure of proposed patents before they are granted. Id art. 93(1),
13 I.L.M. at 293.
90. In contrast, the laws of the United States are more favorable to inventors, who receive
a patent grant only from the date the patent issues. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (issue of patent); 35

U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. 1992) (term of patent grant).
91. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 212; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING
LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT 23 (1989) (Box 1-A summarizes backlog of animal patent applications
in Europe as of 1988); cf.Geraldi, supra note 5, at 591 (discussing the patent backlog at PTO,
which was exacerbated by constitutional policy concerns and interpretation of the United States
Patent Act).
92. Contra Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309 ("anything under the sun that is made by man"
is patentable).
93. The decision notes that exclusions to the general principle of patentability contained
in Article 52(1) EPC are to be "interpreted narrowly." HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat.
Off. Rep. 525,527.
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might be reached in applying Article 53(a) EPC."' In this case, the
patent was granted on the basis of the fundamental medical utility of
the Onco-mouse. 5 The EPO underscored the narrow scope of the
decision when it recently opposed a similar mouse patent designed to
study hair growth because the study was not deemed to be sufficiently
important to outweigh animal suffering. 6 Furthermore, the scope of
the Onco-mouse patent specifically precludes the patenting of human
beings. 7 Thus, inventions involving human cells may have insufficient precedent to be granted patent protection. 98
HARVARD/Onco-mouse illustrates potential problems with
patenting biotechnological inventions in the EC under the current
system because of the ethical prohibition of Article 53(a) of the EPC.
The narrow reading of the ethics provision of Article 53(a) in this case
is economically troublesome for the EC. This provision could be
invoked to thwart almost any biotechnological invention because
genetic engineering, a major technique used to create biotechnological
inventions, is a controversial process. 9 The problem is especially
pronounced in the international marketplace because the provision is
unique to the EC.1" Unless Article 53(a) is interpreted leniently and
uniformly, the EPO could further undermine the European biotechnol-

94. Id. at 528.
95. The Examining Division determined that the possibility of remedying widespread and
dangerous diseases combined with reduction of overall suffering of laboratory animals outweighed
considerations that might otherwise constitute an unpatentable invention based on moral
concerns. Id at 527.
96. See Debates, supra note 50, at 17; EC Debate,supra note 15.
97. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4, 6. During the application
process, the applicants modified the patent to claim only nonhuman mammals. Id. at 5-6.
98. The problem with insufficient protection of human cells is especially enhanced by the
recent amendments to the Proposed Directive. For example, Amendment No. 15 limits the
general rule set forth in Article 2 of the Proposed Directive allowing patentability of biological
matter that self-replicates by stating that the "human body or parts of the human body.., shall
not be patentable." Amended Proposal, supra note 34, at 185; see also Geraldi, supra note 5, at
592-93 (discussing the potential negative economic effect of the failure to provide an incentive
for patent protection on the development of beneficial human-based products).
99. See, e g., Dennis S. Karjala,A Legal ResearchAgenda for the Human Genome Initiative,
32 JURnMEnmcs J. 121, 152-53 (1992). Moreover, even if the EPO grants a biotechnological
patent, such protection can be revoked under national laws in certain circumstances. EPC, supra
note 23, art. 138, 13 I.L.M. at 302.
100. The EPO Examining Division has noted that "[n]o article analogous to Article 53(b)
EPC exists in the Patent Laws of the USA, Japan and Australia" which would allow granting of
patents on animals as long as the standard patentability requirements are satisfied. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4, 10.
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ogy industry, which is already hampered by relatively stringent regulations.'0 '
The Onco-mouse decision indicates that the EPO may prevent the
patenting of biotechnological inventions, perhaps contrary to the intent
of the drafters of the EPO Guidelines. The text of the Guidelines
indicates that Article 53(a) was meant to safeguard the public,"~ but
that it should be invoked "only in rare and extreme cases." 3 The
Guidelines note that a consideration of "whether it is probable that the
public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the
grant of patent rights would be inconceivable" is the proper test to
apply.0 4 The Appeals Board determined that the Onco-mouse was
such a case, even though it had fundamental utility as a medical
research tool.0 5 While the public perceptions in the United States
should not be grafted onto the European public, the fact that the
United States had already issued a similar patent and prospered from
such a decision"°6 indicates that a patent in this case is not entirely
inconceivable. Also, the fact that not all members of the Parliament
are opposed to the Proposed Directive,0 7 a measure that would
permit such patents to issue routinely, indicates that the Onco-mouse
concept is not so abhorrent as to be inconceivable to the European
public. This is buttressed by the fact that the Parliament is the most
democratic institution of the EC'°8 and therefore probably most
accurately reflects the opinions among the citizens of the member
states.

101. See, eg., BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 186-96; Buchan, supra note 49,
at 2. Further evidence of the problem is that investors and companies, including Europeans, are
turning to the United States to take advantage of lenient regulations and liberal patent protection.
See, eg., Buchan, supra.
102. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 31, ch. IV, j 3.1.
103. Id.
104. Id. The example given in the EPO guidelines of an unpatentable inventions based on
Article 53(a) is a letter bomb. Id. The Appeals Board considered three interests: curing a
dangerous disease, protection of the environment, and avoiding cruelty to animals. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,527.
105. Id.
106. See supranotes 66-74 and accompanying text (discussing the grant of the Onco-mouse
patent in the United States and the subsequent development of the biotechnology industry).
107. Debates, supra note 50, passim.
108. See EEC TREATY art. 137 (European Parliament consists of representatives of the
member states).
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I. THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE TO ENHANCE THE
PROTECTION OF
BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS
A. The Significance of the Proposed Directive
A study of the Onco-mouse experience reveals that the EC should
reform patent protection for biotechnological inventions in order to
enhance common market goals." The EC has already recognized
the importance of the biotechnology industry, as manifested by the
allocation of special funding for biotechnology research and development." ° This is consistent with the international promotion of
biotechnology."'
However, the EC biotechnology programs are intended not only
to mobilize research and development, but also to enhance the
competitiveness of European industry.12 Enhanced and uniform
patent protection is still necessary to compete on an international

109. See supra notes 60-101 and accompanying text; Buchan, supra note 49, at 2.
110. See, eg., Council Decision of 27 Nov. 1989 on a Specific Research and Technological
Development Programme in the Field of Biotechnology (1990-1994) (Bridge), 1989 OJ. (L 360)
32,32-34; Council Decision of 23 Feb. 1989 on a First Multiannual Programme (1988-1993) for
Biotechnology-based Agro-industrial Research and Technology Development-Eclair (European
Collaborative Linkage of Agriculture and Industry Through Research), 1989 O.J. (L 60) 48,
48-50; Council Decision of 7 Dec. 1981 Adopting a Multi-annual Research and Training
Programme for the European Economic Community in the Field of Bimolecular Engineering,
1981 OJ. (L 375) 1, 1-4.
111. See R. Gerold, Research Contracts in Execution of the European Science and
Technology Community, in ASSER INSITrUTE COLLOQUIM ON EUROPEAN LAW, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: LEGAL ASPECTS 39, 45-46 (1987)
[hereinafter ASSER INsTTUTE CoLLOQUIM]. For example, one multinational European program
in technology is EUREKA, which aims to increase productivity and international competitiveness
of Europe's industry and economies. See Declaration of Principles relating to EUREKA, in
ASSER INSTI.TUT COLLOQUIM, supra, at 105-08; R.-J.H.M. Smits, Technology and European
Cooperation:Introductory Remarks, in ASSER INSTITUTE COLLOQUIM, supra, at 31, 36-37.
112. BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 161. However, the EC needs to move
from promulgating isolated research programs to developing a comprehensive strategy in the area
of biotechnology to take advantage of the commercial prospects of biotechnology. See
Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E12; Mark Cantley, Biotechnology in
Europe"The Role of the Commission of the European Communities, in BIOTECHNOLOGY IN
FUTURE SOCIETY: SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 9, 10 (Edward Yoxen & Vittorio Di
Martino eds., 1989).
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level. 13 An EC Directive improving the legal protection of biotechnology would address this problem directly.
B. The Proposed Directive 4
The Commission has proposed a promising Directive to create
uniform legal protection for biotechnological inventions. 15 First
presented in 1988, the Proposalfor a Council Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, as amended, allows
"biological material" to be patented 6 if it meets the traditional
requirements for patentability set forth in Article 52(1) of the
EPC."7 The Amended Proposal defines biological matter as "self
replicating living matter""' and further clarifies Article 2 of the
Proposed Directive, which stated that "an invention shall not be
considered unpatentable for the reason only that it is composed of
living matter""' 9 by delineating additional exclusions to the general rule
of patentability for living matter.'

113. See, eg., Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, 1989 OJ. (C 159) 10, 10-11 [hereinafter Opinion on the Proposed
Directive]. The EC has the power to dictate results via directives since the directives mandate
a common result but allow member nations to choose their own means of reaching the end
results. See EEC TREATY art. 189.
114. The Proposed Directive covers procedural issues related to biotechnological patents
beyond the scope of this Note which instead focuses on the patentability of biotechnology. See
Proposed Directive, supranote 18, arts. 10, 14, 17 (infringement problems, licenses, and burden
of proof issues particular to living matter). For a further discussion of these procedural issues see
COOK ET.AL, supranote 2, at 134-35; Robin Whaite & Nigel Jones, BiotechnologicalPatents in
Europe-The Draft Directive,5 EuR. INTEL. PROP. REV. 145, 150-51 (1989).
115. Proposed Directive, supra note 18, at 3.
116. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 2, at 185 (Amendment No. 13); see also
Proposed Directive, supranote 18, art. 2 (stating that "living matter" is not per se unpatentable).
If enacted, the Proposed Directive would have the same effect as the United States Supreme
Court holding in Diamondv. Chakrabartywhich explicitly allowed living matter to be patented.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). This case made it clear that living matter was
patentable as long as it satisfied the traditional requirements of patentability. Id. at 307-10; see
also supranotes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing Chakrabartycase as the beginning of
biotechnology protection in the United States).
117. See EPC, supra note 23, art. 52(1), 13 I.L.M. at 285 (the traditional requirements for
patentability are industrial applicability, novelty, and an inventive step).
118. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 2(a), at 185 (Amendment No. 14); see also
Proposed Directive, supranote 18, arts. 10-13 (extending protection to subsequent generations).
The Onco-mouse patent, thus, would protect subsequent offspring of the mouse which had
identical genetic material characteristic to the patented invention.
119. Proposed Directive, supranote 18, art. 2.
120. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, arts. 2(b)-2(j), at 185-86 (Amendment Nos. 7-20).
The Proposed Directive also set forth examples of patentable subject matter on a smaller scale.
Proposed Directive, supra note 18, arts. 3-7.
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The Proposed Directive complements the EPO Guidelines by
clarifying and mandating results similar to the EPO Guidelines and by
addressing issues not discussed in the Guidelines. Recall that the EPO
Guidelines, which attempted to define the EPC terms, 121 were not
binding on the member states.m Thus, if enacted, the Proposed
Directive would take the EPO Guidelines one step further by making
the definition of terms binding on all EC members.'
For example,
the Amended Proposal explains that a microbiological process consists
of a succession of steps in which "at least one essential step of the
process is microbiological."'
It also explains that whether a
biotechnological invention is more than an "essentially biological"
process' will be determined on the basis of the amount of human
intervention and its impact on the result.1
C. The Potential of the Proposed Directive
The Proposed Directive is an important step that the EC must
take in order to compete internationally. 7 Eight years ago the
United States government recognized the growing importance of the
biotechnology industry and conducted a study to determine the
identity of its global competitors.' At that time the United States
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) determined that although
European nations had inherent strengths in scientific research, the
strengths were underutilized for commercial purposes due to insufficient biotechnology protection.2 9 The Commission recognizes the

121. EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 31, ch. IV, 3.4.
122. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
123. See Proposed Directive, supra note 18, art. 1; see also EEC TREATY art. 189
(regulations made by the Council and Commission are binding on member states).
124. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 5(a), at 187 (Amendment No. 24). The
Proposed Directive defined microbiological process as one that is "carried out with the use of or
performed upon or resulting in a micro-organism." Proposed Directive, supra note 18, art. 5.
125. See EPC, supranote 23, art. 53,13 LL.M. at 286; EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 31, ch.
IV, 3.4.
126. See Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 7, at 187 (Amendment No. 25); Proposed
Directive, supra note 18, art. 7; COOK ET"AL, supra note 2, at 134.
127. See Opinion on the Proposed Directive, supranote 113, at 10-11 (Economic and Social
Committee opinion affirming international competitiveness as a goal of the Proposed Directive).
128. See COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note l,passim (report assessing the United
States' ability to compete in commercial development of new biotechnology).
129. See generallyid. at 401 (stating types and degrees of biotechnology protection in various

communities). The Commission noted this problem and referenced the U.S. OTA report
specifically. Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E3. The Commission's

response was to enact a series of biotechnology research and development programs. See, e.g.,
Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting a Multiannual Research Action Programme of the
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necessity of increasing patent protection for biotechnology" and has
stated that the purpose of the Proposed Directive is "to establish
harmonized, clear and improved standards for protecting biotechnological inventions in order to foster the overall innovatory potential and
competitiveness of Community science and industry in [the] important
field of modem technology.""n Despite the fact that the Commission recognizes the necessity of increasing protection of biotechnology,
it has not yet transformed this concern into action. Thus, while the EC
continues to debate the ethical implications of biotechnology, the
United States and other nations have already given increased
protection to biotechnological inventions.'
The delay in enactment casts a negative light on the future of
biotechnological patents in the EC. If the Proposed Directive
continues to languish in the Parliament, the chances of passing a
directive that remains true to the intent of the Commission is
increasingly diminished. Amendments enacted by the Parliament that
introduce ambiguous new terms into the Proposed Directive, such as
"unnatural processes" for the production or modification of animals, 33 threaten to erode the Commission's intent as well as the
effectiveness of the Proposed Directive. The ambiguity of this phrase
diminishes the prospect of patenting biotechnological inventions as the
interpretation of the term "unnatural" will be subject to the caprice of
each member state.
In turn, the future of biotechnological patents appears bleak
because the patentability obstacles of the EPC and EPO Guidelines
are reinforced by the Amended Proposal. The general rule proposed
by the Commission that allowed living matter to be patented has since
been amended to include a provision analogous to EPC Article
The general rule has been eroded by other amendments,
53(a).'

European Economic Community in the Field of Biotechnology, COM(84)230 final.
130. See Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E12.
131. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, COM(88)496 final at 6.
132. See eg., BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 193-94, 223.
133. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 2(e), at 186 (Amendment No. 18). However,
some of the amendments were foreseeable as analogous to proposals suggested in the United
States Congress at a similar juncture in biotechnology development. In particular, the farmer's
privilege under the Amended Proposal is similar to the farmer's exception which was drafted into
the House Transgenic Animal Reform Act. Compare Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art.
12(a), at 189 with H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1988).
134. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, art. 2(c), at 185 (Amendment No. 16).
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as well. Interspecies animals are declared per se unpatentable, 135 and
genetically engineered animals that involve unnatural processes,
unnecessary suffering, or unnecessary physical harm are unpatentable. 6 It is doubtful that even the Onco-mouse, whose "usefulness
to mankind can not be denied .. ."' could have succeeded in
overcoming these obstacles to patentability."'
The Proposed Directive remains an important step that the EC
needs to take. That is the case despite the fact that the Amended
Proposal, if enacted in its current form, may take a smaller step toward
enhancing international competitiveness than originally envisioned by
the Commission. Nonetheless, without some legislative action, the
biotechnology industry will lack the necessary incentive to invest in the
EC,P9 and the common market concept will be weakened in this
burgeoning field.'
D. The Status of the Proposed Directive
While the Proposed Directive was first presented in 1988, the
141
passage of the measure has since been stalled by the Green Party
and animal rights groups who oppose the legislation. 42 Because of
these pressures, the Parliament has twice tabled the Proposed
1 43
Directive for reconsideration of ethical and moral problems.
Furthermore, passage of the Proposed Directive was delayed a third
time in order to determine whether it conflicts with the biodiversity
convention recently signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janerio,
Brazil.1' Despite these obstacles, the recent enactment of over forty
135. Id.art. 2(), at 186 (Amendment No. 19 declares "interspecific" animals to be
unpatentable).
136. Id.art. 2(e), at 186 (Amendment No. 18).
137. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,527.
138. See supra notes 75-91 (discussing the history of the Onco-mouse in the EPO).
139. See CoMMcERaAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 21; notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of patent protection to stimulate biotechnology research and
commercialization).
140. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
141. The Green Parties are an umbrella group for organizations with concerns not addressed
by mainstream parties. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 187. They are typically
skeptical of new technology. Id. Biotechnology is their newest target of criticism since nuclear
energy is no longer in the spotlight. Id.

142. See, eg., Suzanne Perry, EC Bio-Tech PatentPlan Stalled by Ethics Money, Reuters,
Mar. 6, 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
143. See EuropeanParliamentBlocks Bill by EC Commission on Biotech Patents,Int'l Env't
Daily (BNA), June 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.

144. The major concern was that "an agreement in the Rio biodiversity convention
concerning royalty payments to Third World countries for patented material derived from the
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amendments' 45 indicates that the Parliament has a strong interest in
the continued viability of the legislation and the passage of this
sweeping measure.
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES SHOULD NOT THWART
ENACTMENT
A. Ethical Issues Regarding Patents Are Misplaced
The ethical concerns currently raised in conjunction with
biotechnology patents are misplaced because they stem from a lack of
understanding of the patent system. A patent system is not a means
of safeguarding the public interest. It is primarily a commercial and
industrial tool that encourages innovation, divorced from social and
ethical concerns.
Because a patent grant affords a limited commercial monopoly to
use only what is already in existence, the grant of a patent is not an
ethical event. 47 Instead, it is the regulatory system of a given nation
that monitors social concerns as it implements general legislation-concerns which frequently encompass ethics and morality' 48
Thus, a patent makes the existing research on genetic engineering open
and available to the public, which, in turn, permits public monitoring
of genetic engineering. 49 In the context of the FDA decision on
genetically engineered foods, 5 ° it was noted that "[g]enetic technology is too promising.., to dismiss it out of a free-floating mistrust. 'If

genetic resources of [those] nations" would conflict with provisions in the Proposed Directive.
Id.
145. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, at 183-95.

146. See Proposed Directive, supra note 18, at 4 ("the function of a patent is to reward the
inventor with an exclusive but time-bound right for his creative efforts and thereby encourage
inventive activities . .. ."); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The
Patent System and ControversialTechnologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067-68 (1988) (assessing

technology and determining potential social consequences is not the function of patent law).
147. See Bent, supra note 69, at 7; Debates, supra note 50, at 18 (right of prohibition only).
148. See BIOTECHNOLOGY GLOBAL, supra note 2, at 203-04; Bent, supra note 69, at 7-8;

Merges, supra note 146, at 1067-68.
149. Debates, supra note 50, at 18. Rapporteur Rothley stated that:

[i]t is a common and mistaken assumption that the fact of being able to patent
genetically modified plants or animals will prompt research into genetic engineering in
the first place. But that research is taking place. The right of patent is just as likely to
prompt it as it is to prevent it. The issue is whether the process takes place in secret or
is transparent. The right of patent contributes to the transparency of genetic
engineering, and that transparency guarantees increased safety.
Id.
150. See supranotes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing genetically engineered food).
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the public understood the technology, they would understand that part
of their emotional reaction is irrational .
,,," It is evident, then,
that ethical concerns raised about the patent system reflect concerns
about biotechnology itself rather than the grant of the patent for that
biotechnology. Ethical issues associated with patents are inappropriately channeled fears of insufficient regulation." Nevertheless, the
patent system has become another arena for the campaigns of the
Green Party, environmental groups, and animal rights activists to try
to regulate science and technology. 3 In fact, biological patents have
been granted routinely since the 1800s,'5 but ethical concerns did not
enter the realm of the patent system until genetic engineering
blossomed. Public concern over patenting biotechnology may reflect
a public reaction to the scope and sophistication of genetic engineering
involved in biotechnology due to misperceptions and unfounded fear
of genetic engineering. This is illustrated by a series of decisions in the
United States and Europe.
In 1970, the German Supreme Court allowed a living organism to
be patented in the Red Dove case.' That case preceded the development of genetic engineering and was not followed by any significant
public controversy. 6 However, following the advent of genetic
engineering the 1980 United States Supreme Court holding in
Chakrabarty,which paralleled the Red Dove decision in principle by
holding genetically engineered bacteria to be patentable, was followed

151. Molly O'Neill, Geneticists'Latest Discovery: PublicFearof 'Frankenfood,'N.Y. TIMES,
June 28,1992 at Al, A14 (comments of Dr. Susan K. Harlander, researcher and professor of food
science and nutrition at the University of Minnesota); see also Cantley, supra note 113, at 14-18
(observations on public confidence as an essential element to developing biotechnology); Jorgen
Lindgaard Pedersen, PublicDebateon Biotechnology:The Case ofDenmark,in BIOTECHNOLOGY
IN FUTURE SociEry: SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS FOR EUROPE 107-15 (Edward Yoxen & Vittorio

Di Martino eds., 1989) (discussing the development of public regulation of biotechnology in
Denmark).
152. See generally Cantley, supra note 112, at 14-15 (effective regulation takes into
consideration deep-rooted political and cultural considerations).
153. See, eg., David Burke, Note, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: Renewed Challenge
to Animal Patents,59 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 409,410 (1991); Jac H. Kim, Note, PatentLaw:

PatentingAnimal Life: Another Scapegoat for Small Interest Groups, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 131,
passim (1989).
154. See Alex Barnum, Biotech Labs Enragedby Bid to PatentHuman Genes, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 2, 1991, at B (patent grant given to Louis Pasteur).
155. Rote Taube (Red Dove), 1 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & CoPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 136
(1970) (English translation of excerpts of the Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof); Straus, supra
note 4, at 17-18.
156. See Straus, supra note 4, at 17-18.
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7
by a public debate over the morality of patenting living matter.5
Then, in 1987 the United States Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences determined in Ex ParteAllen that higher life forms, such
That decision triggered significantly
as oysters, were patentable.'
more controversy' 9 than a typical Board decision."6 Finally, the
1987 PTO decision to allow genetically engineered animals such as the
Onco-mouse to be patented stimulated tremendous controversy.16'
This litany indicates that debate over patenting biotechnology has
sharpened with the sophistication and use of biotechnology despite the
fact that the underlying scientific principles and patent procedures
remain the same.
There is a distinct paucity of case law that discusses ethical issues
as a preclusion to patentability. This is the case even in the EPO
decisions despite the existence of Article 53(a), which explicitly allows
a consideration of ethics for patentability. The EPO Guidelines
indicate that Article 53(a) is to be invoked only in "rare and extreme
cases"'162 and is aimed at preventing extreme situations such as riots
and criminal behavior. 63 The lack of discussion prior to HARVARD/Onco-mouse may indicate that ethics were generally not
considered in patenting decisions. In fact, the Examining Division
initially stated in HARVARD/Onco-mouse that it does not consider
patent law an appropriate legislative tool and therefore declined to
rule under Article 53(a)."54
To a limited extent, the EPO Guidelines on Article 53(a) and the
United States' cases are illuminating on the role ethics should play in
the area of patentability. Ethics have been considered regarding the
usefulness requirement that all patentable inventions must meet in
both the EC and the United States. The issue is whether ethical issues
render an invention "useless" according to statutory requirements for
patentability." In the United States, courts historically have been

157. See generally id at 17-18 (indicating public concern about patenting higher organisms
stems from the novelty of genetic engineering and a general lack of understanding of how the
patent system functions).
158. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987).
159. See Manspeizer, supra note 9, at 418-19; Merges, supra note 146, at 1052.
160. See Merges, supra note 146, at 1052.
161. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing legislative activity following
the grant of the Onco-mouse patent).
162. EPO GUIDELDIES, supra note 31, ch. IV, 3.1.

163. Id.
164. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1990 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 4, 11.
165. See Merges, supra note 146, at 1062-63.
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reluctant to deny patents based solely on ethical concerns 1 " and
consider an invention patentable so long as it has some moral use.167
The drafters of the EPO Guidelines seem to concur in this result. The
Guidelines state that a patent may be granted if an invention has both
an offensive and nonoffensive use." The Guidelines set forth as an
example a process for breaking open safes; that is a process that may
be offensive if used by burglars, but which is potentially nonoffensive
69
and very useful if used by a locksmith in an emergency.
B. Ethical Issues Are Dealt with by Regulations
The patent system functions independently of the regulatory system170 and therefore should not be used as a regulatory tool. This is
buttressed by the fact that the Amended Directive recognizes that the
patent system could be used to regulate ethical concerns but specifically directs member states to regulate bioethics before an invention
reaches the stage of patentability. 7 ' As noted in the Parliamentary
debates, patents are an inappropriate tool with which to regulate
research.'72 Requiring the patent system to operate as a regulatory
system would merely duplicate the work of the existing regulatory
framework and would threaten inconsistent results. 3 Furthermore,
EC biotechnology regulations take ethical issues into account by
regulating risks associated with genetic engineering. 4 The EPO has

166. See, eg., Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1977);
Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274,275-76 (7th Cir. 1903). The only cases in which United States courts
considered the issue of ethics in denying patents appeared in the 1800s. See, eg., Lowell v. Lewis
15 F. Cas. 1018,1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (stating in dicta that an invention must be
"useful," as opposed to "mischievous" in order to receive a patent).
167. See Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. 433, 467 (1873) (holding patent process void for want of
utility if "injurious and pernicious").
168. EPO GUIDEmES, supra note 31, ch. IV, 3.3.
169. IL
170. See generally In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 259-60 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (scope of PTO duty
limited to determining whether invention within parameters of patentability).
171. See Amended Proposal, supra note 34, at 184 (Amendment No. 6).
172. Debates, supranote 50, at 18.
173. See eg., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 433 F.2d 1034, 1039 n.7
(2d Cir. 1970) ("to require the Patent Office to make an affirmative finding as to the safety of
a drug for human use would work a serious overlapping of the respective jurisdictions of the
Patent Office and the Food and Drug Administration").
174. For instance, the Contained Use Directive sets minimum standards for research and
development for industrial operations based on the risk associated with the modified
mi roorganism and the type of research. See Council Directive 90/219 of 23 April 1990 on the
Contained Use of Genetically Modified Micro-organisms, 1990 OJ. (L 117) 1, 2-6; see also
Council Directive 90/220 of 23 April 1990 on the Deliberate Release Into the Environment of
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stated that "[t]he regulation of the handling of dangerous material is
not the task of the European Patent Office but is rather the business
'
of specialised governmental authorities."175
C. The Proposed Directive Also Acknowledges and Deals with
Ethical Concerns
The Amended Proposal indicates that the Parliament has strived
to attain a balance between necessary reform aimed at international
competitiveness and accommodation of ethical issues. The Amended
Proposal requires rules on patenting living matter to consider ethical
repercussions, as well as global and EC strategies,176 and it suggests
that mechanisms should be developed to address concerns at the
regulatory level.'77 The specific exclusion of human beings or parts
of humans,'78 as well as detailed exclusions on patentability of
animals,'79 should quell some anxiety over patenting living matter
and enhance the possibility of enactment. The focus is on balancing
concerns. This is illustrated by a comparative assessment introduced
in the Amended Proposal that requires the usefulness of the invention,
as well as possible risks and objections based on fundamental legal
principles, to be considered in determining whether an invention is
unpatentable because it violates public order and morality. 8 '

Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 16-21; Claus-Joerg Ruetsch & Terry R.
Broderick, New Biotechnology Legislation in the European Community and FederalRepublic of

Germany, INT'L Bus. LAW., Oct. 1990, at 408, 408-11 (discussing the new Directive and the
response of Germany).

Similarly, in the United States the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates
biotechnologically altered food products and therefore courts have determined that it would be

redundant for the PTO to examine possible ethical implications of proposed patents. See, e.g.,
In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1399-1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (refusing to invalidate patent for drug
despite FDA suspension of drug for acute side effects); In re Hartop, 311 F.2d at 260 (refusing
to invalidate patent because of potential dangerous side effects).
175. HARVARD/Onco-mouse, 1991 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 525,528.
176. Amended Proposal, supra note 34, at 183 (Amendment No. 4).
177. Id. at 184 (Amendment No. 6).
178. Id. art. 2(b), at 185 (Amendment No. 15).
179. Id. arts. 2(e)-2(f), at 186 (Amendment Nos. 18-19).
180. Id. art. 2(d), at 186 (Amendment No. 17). This appears to be a tacit acknowledgement
of the test set forth by the EPO in HARVARD/Onco-mouse. See supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text (discussing test suggested by Appeals Board and used by the Examining

Division in finding the Onco-mouse deserving of a patent).
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V. CONCLUSION

Imposing barriers to biotechnological patents will not prevent the
advance of genetic engineering or address the ethical issues raised by
scientific advancement. These issues will persist regardless of whether
patents are granted."1 Furthermore, even if the EC ignores the field
of biotechnology, its international competitors will not."
As the
United States Supreme Court stated, "The grant or denial of patents
on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research...
[however] [w]hether ... claims are patentable may determine whether

research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by
want of incentives.""le In Germany a special Commission of Inquiry
on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic Technology echoed these
insights and stated that the types of "criticism of genetic engineering
are often simultaneously or primarily criticisms of over-arching
strategies which have developed independently of genetic engineering
184
...

involving basic problems of... industrialization."

The Proposed Directive should be enacted by the EC because it
recognizes the potential ethical concerns and the reality of scientific
progress." The international competitors of the EC are capitalizing
on biotechnology and encouraging scientific innovation by allowing
biotechnological patents to issue under systems more lenient than the
EPC. The Proposed Directive begins to address the EC gap in
protection for biotechnological inventions, which are crucial to the
commercial and international competitiveness of the EC, by mandating
uniform legal protection. Although the scope of protection for
biotechnological inventions under the Amended Proposal is more
limited than the Proposed Directive originally introduced by the
Commission, passage of the Directive is still a necessary step to take
in narrowing the gap between the EC and its international competitors.
Whether the Proposed Directive will achieve its goals remains to be
seen. However, the history of the European Onco-mouse has shown
181. In addition, it is inefficient to try to accommodate ethical norms which may change.
For example, the United Kingdom refused to claim contraceptives under the Royal Prerogative
under the 1949 Act, but now allows condoms to be the subject of Government advertising. See
COOK Er. AL, supra note 2,'at 120.
182. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
183. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 317.
184. Wolf-Michael Catenhusen, Public Debate on Biotechnology: The Experience of the
Bundestag Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic Engineering, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN FUTURE SOCIETY: SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS FOR EUROPE

(Edward Yoxen & Vittorio Di Martino eds., 1989).
185. See Amended Proposal, supra note 34, at 183 (Amendment Nos. 2, 4).

117, 123
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that the current outlook for biotechnological innovations will remain
bleak if no action is taken.
The Onco-mouse currently stands alone in an area of inadequate
and murky protection for biotechnology innovations. Without
immediate action on the part of the Commission and member states,
the EC will stand alone in its ethical debate as other nations simultaneously commercialize biotechnology and manage ethical concerns
associated with biotechnological inventions.
Cynthia M. Ho

